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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 980149-CA
Priority No. 2

DEBORAH JO ANN SISK,
Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Deborah Jo Ann Sisk appeals from a decision of the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Iron County, Utah. The Defendant appeals the guilty verdict, as well as a
provision in her sentence by the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, District Court Judge, which
prohibited the sale, possession, care or transportation of any animal during the term of her
probation, and further required the Defendant to remove from her ownership the six animals
she possessed at the time the sentence was rendered. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e), 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Statement of the Issues
1. Were the actions and omissions of Defendant's trial counsel so lacking and
ineffective as to deprive Defendant of her constitutional right to assistance of counsel?

2. Does the provision in Defendant's sentence requiring her to sell or trade animals
in her possession, and prohibiting the Defendant from owning, possessing, or caring for any
animals, amount to cruel and unusual punishment?
Standard of Review
1. In determining whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that: (a) the trial counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment; and (b) there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the ineffective assistance, the
result of the proceeding would have been more favorable to the defendant. See Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984); State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d 153 (Utah 1989).
2. To determine whether a sentence rises to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment in any given case, the standard requires that the criminal punishment have some
rough proportionality to the nature of the crime. See Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 285-90
(1980); State v. Gardner. 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a conviction dated December 19, 1997, in the Fifth Judicial
District Court, in and for Iron County, Utah, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding.
At the trial on that date, the Defendant was convicted by a jury of five (5) counts of
2

Aggravated Cruelty to Animals, and thirty-two (32) counts of Cruelty to Animals. These
charges arose from an investigation conducted by law enforcement, initiated by complaints
made regarding the conditions then-existing at the Defendant's pet store.
Defendant now seeks to overturn her conviction on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. In addition, the Defendant seeks to overturn the provision of her
sentence imposed by Judge Braithwaite requiring her to sell or trade animals in her possession,
and prohibiting the Defendant from owning, possessing, or caring for any animals during the
period of her probation, on the basis that these provisions rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment.
The State of Utah asserts that Defendant's trial counsel performed in a sufficient
manner during the trial in this matter, and that trial counsel's performance did not fall below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. Moreover, the State of Utah
asserts that, even if Defendant's trial counsel had performed differently, the outcome of the
proceeding would not have been more favorable to the Defendant.
In addition, the State of Utah avers that the sentence imposed by Judge Braithwaite
which required the Defendant to sell or trade animals in her possession, and prohibited the
Defendant from owning, possessing, or caring for any animals during the period of her
probation, is appropriate, and is a punishment in proportion to the offenses resulting in
Defendant's conviction.
3

2. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On July 28, 1997, the State of Utah filed an Information against the Defendant,
alleging five (5) counts of Aggravated Cruelty to Animals, each a Class A Misdemeanor,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-301(1) (1953, as amended); and 32 (thirty-two)
counts of Cruelty to Animals, each a Class B Misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-9-301(3) (1953, as amended). These charges arose out of complaints made to law
enforcement regarding the deplorable conditions existing at the Defendant's pet store.
Pursuant to an investigation of the matter, officers with the Cedar City Police
Department inspected the Defendant's pet store, and used a videotape camera to document that
inspection. Dr. H.S. Thinnes, a local veterinarian, arrived on the scene sometime thereafter
to examine the condition of the animals located in the pet store. In addition to capturing the
conditions of the pet store, the officers' videotape also recorded Dr. Thinnes' routine
diagnoses of the animals.
At the time of trial, the State of Utah introduced the videotape of the crime scene
into evidence for the purpose of identifying each of the thirty-seven (37) animals as those
animals related to each of the thirty-seven (37) counts in the Information. The Defendant's
trial counsel did not object to the admission of that videotape.
At the sentencing hearing on February 13, 1998, the Defendant was sentenced to a
term of one (1) year in the Iron County Jail, and assessed a twenty-five hundred dollar
4

($2,500.00) fine on Count I, Aggravated Cruelty to Animals, a Class A Misdemeanor. Judge
Braithwaite stayed the execution of that sentence, and placed the Defendant on thirty-six
months supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole. At that time, the trial court
ordered the Defendant to serve a fifteen (15) day term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail.
In addition, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay a fifteen hundred dollar ($1,500.00)
fine, and granted the Defendant an option to complete three hundred (300) hours of
community service in lieu of paying the fifteen hundred dollar ($1,500.00) fine.
Included in the terms of the Defendant's probation were the requirements that the
Defendant: (a) not seek, obtain, or perform any employment that included the sale, possession,
care, or transportation of any animal during the period of her probation; and (b) sell or trade
the animals in her possession at the time of sentencing, within forty-five (45) days of the
sentence, after which the Defendant could not possess or own any animals as a term of her
probation. The sentences for Counts II through XXXVII were stayed pending the Defendant's
successful completion of all terms and conditions of probation.
On March 10, 1998, the Defendant appealed her conviction, and is requesting this
Court to overturn her conviction. Additionally, the Defendant requests that this Court
overturn the condition of her sentence/probation requiring her to remove all animals from her
care and/or possession during the period of her probation.

5

3. Statement of the Facts
On February 15, 1997, the Defendant entered into a lease for the premises located at
60 North Main in Cedar City, Utah, for the purpose of establishing a pet store. The
Defendant named this pet store "Pinky's Pets". In February, 1997, the Defendant's brotherin-law passed away. Subsequently, on July 15, 1997, the Defendant learned that her brother
had also passed away. As a result of the shock the Defendant experienced from these deaths,
the Defendant alleged she experienced a nervous breakdown and was admitted to the Dixie
Regional Medical Center in St. George, Utah on July 16, 1997.
On that same day, July 16, 1997, Cedar City Animal Control Officer Kerry Gunter
was contacted by three teenagers. These teenagers informed Officer Gunter that they had tried
to gain access to the Defendant's pet store since July 14, 1997 (two days prior to Defendant
entering the hospital), but had not been able to find anyone in the store. The teenagers
informed Officer Gunter that the animals were running loose in the pet store. Consequently,
Officer Gunter endeavored to make contact with someone at the store that afternoon. Officer
Gunter noticed that all the pet store doors were locked, and made a visual observation of the
appalling conditions existing within the pet store. Specifically, Officer Gunter observed
animals running loose throughout the store, that feces and urine were present on the floor, and
that there appeared to be no food or water available to the animals.

6

Officer Gunter contacted Animal Control Officer Jason Thomas on July 17, 1997,
and advised Officer Thomas that the animals at the Defendant's pet store were not being cared
for. Officer Thomas responded to the Defendant's pet store, where he found the Defendant's
daughter, Nikki Sisk, present. Nikki Sisk permitted Officer Thomas to enter the store. Upon
entering the pet store, Officer Thomas noticed the deplorable conditions, and in fact
discovered five kittens that were already dead or in the process of dying. Officer Thomas
contacted Officer Gunter, who then responded to Defendant's pet store.
At that time, Nikki Sisk adamantly stated that she was not the party responsible for
the store in the Defendant's absence. Instead, she stated that James Sisk, the Defendant's
estranged husband, had been left in control of the store during the Defendant's hospitalization.
In light of that statement, the officers contacted Mr. Sisk, who also denied any responsibility
for the care of Defendant's store.
Pursuant to the officers' investigation of the pet store conditions, Officer Thomas
obtained a videotape camera to document the police investigation. Sometime thereafter, Dr.
H.S. Thinnes, a local veterinarian, arrived on the scene to examine the animals within the pet
store. As Officer Thomas videotaped the crime scene, his videotape also captured portions of
Dr. Thinnes' narration and diagnoses of the animals he was examining. Therefore, some of
Dr. Thinnes' professional opinions of the store conditions were included in Officer Thomas'
videotape.
7

Also contained on that videotape was an accurate accounting of the conditions of the
animals inside the Defendant's pet store. This videotape contained scenes of animals without
food or water, and surrounded by feces and urine, in various stages of illness.
Officer Gunter contacted the Defendant's estranged husband, James Sisk, who
responded to the store and took custody of a large number of animals. All remaining animals
were taken into custody by Officer Gunter.
On July 28, 1997, the Defendant was charged with five (5) counts of Aggravated
Cruelty to Animals, each a Class A Misdemeanor; and thirty-two (32) counts of Cruelty to
Animals, each a Class B Misdemeanor.
At the trial on December 19, 1997, the State introduced into evidence the videotape
of the crime scene, which included portions of Dr. Thinnes' narration and diagnoses, for the
purpose of identifying each of the thirty-seven (37) animals as they related to each of the
thirty-seven (37) counts in the Information. Defendant's trial counsel did not object to the
admission of the videotape.
At the sentencing hearing on February 13, 1998, the Defendant was sentenced to a
term of one (1) year in the Iron County Jail, and assessed a twenty-five hundred dollar
($2,500.00) fine on Count I, Aggravated Cruelty to Animals, a Class A Misdemeanor. Judge
Braithwaite stayed the execution of that sentence, and placed the Defendant on thirty-six
months supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole. At that time, the trial court
8

ordered the Defendant to serve a fifteen (15) day term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail.
In addition, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay a fifteen hundred dollar ($1,500.00)
fine, and granted the Defendant an option to complete three hundred (300) hours of
community service in lieu of paying the fifteen hundred dollar ($1,500.00) fine.
Included in the terms of the Defendant's probation were the requirements that the
Defendant: (a) not seek, obtain, or perform any employment that included the sale, possession,
care, or transportation of any animal during the period of her probation; and (b) sell or trade
the animals in her possession at the time of sentencing, within forty-five (45) days of the
sentence, after which the Defendant could not possess or own any animals as a term of her
probation. The sentences for Counts II through XXXVII were stayed pending the Defendant's
successful completion of all terms and conditions of probation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was
not violated. Although her trial counsel, Keith Barnes, did not object to the entry of the police
videotape into evidence, this failure to object did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonable representation. Furthermore, Mr. Barnes' decision to not object was based on a
sound trial strategy.
Moreover, even if the Defendant were able to establish that Mr. Barnes erred in
failing to object to the videotape, the Defendant cannot establish that she would have received
9

a more favorable outcome at trial if Mr. Barnes had, in fact, objected to the videotape. The
videotape, an admissible piece of evidence, merely illustrated the deplorable conditions
Officers Gunter and Thomas, and Dr. Thinnes, observed, and was a valuable tool in
identifying the individual animals as they related to a specific count in the Information. The
Defendant cannot establish that, in the absence of that videotape, the testimony of State
witnesses, and their verbal descriptions of the scene and the appalling conditions they
witnessed, would be insufficient to establish the Defendant's guilt.
Therefore, because Mr. Barnes' representation did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonable representation, the evidence was admissible, and a more favorable
outcome would not have resulted absent the videotape, the guilty verdict should be affirmed,
and Defendant's appeal dismissed.
In addition, the Defendant's guaranteed protection against cruel and unusual
punishment under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article
1, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution have not been violated. The provision in the Defendant's
probation requiring her to remove all animals from her care and possession during the period
of her probation is commensurate with the offense for which she was charged and convicted.
It is the legitimate penal goal of the State to ensure that the Defendant will not commit similar
offenses during the period of her probation, and the removal of all animals from her custody
and care is the surest means to effect that goal.
10

Therefore, because the Defendant's sentence prohibiting the Defendant from owning,
possessing, caring, or transporting animals is an appropriate sentence which does not approach
cruel and unusual punishment, that sentence should be upheld, and Defendant's appeal should
be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
1.

BARNES' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ENTRY OF THE
VIDEOTAPE INTO EVIDENCE DID NOT FALL BELOW AN
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLE REPRESENTATION,
DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF HER RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND DID NOT RESULT
IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT.

The Defendant was not denied her Constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel merely because her trial counsel, Keith Barnes, did not object to admission of the
police videotape into evidence. The videotape was taken by officers investigating the crime
scene, and was created to document the offenses. It is a visual representation of the crime
scene, is not unduly prejudicial in nature, and is therefore admissible. Furthermore, even if an
objection had been raised, and sustained, against introduction of the videotape, that act, in and
of itself, would not have altered the outcome of the jury trial.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that tt[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of counsel for his
defence [sic]." The United States Supreme Court and Utah Appellate Courts have clarified
and elaborated upon this Constitutional right, holding that defendants have a right to the
11

effective assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington. 466
U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063,80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104
S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984); State v. Classon. 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant has the burden of
satisfying two criteria: (1) that the defendant's trial counsel's performance was so deficient as
to fall below an objective standard of professional reasonable judgment; and (2) that this
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. See State v. Chacon. 344 Utah Adv. Rep. 17,
18 (Utah 1998). In particular, the defendant must identify specific acts or omissions which do
not fall within the ambit of professional representation, and that, absent those acts or
admissions, there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have received a more
favorable result. See id.
In reviewing trial counsel's performance, Utah's Appellate Courts afford a strong
presumption in favor of trial counsel; specifically, the Appellate Courts require the defendant
to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's acts or omissions were the result of sound
trial strategy. A sound rationale underpins this presumption, which is that, absent that
presumption, "'the distorting effects of hindsight' would make it all too easy to conclude that
counsel's assistance was unreasonable." State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). Indeed, this Court has held that it would not "'second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
12

strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect.'" State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), quoting State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 465
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
At the time of Defendant's trial, the State moved for the admission of the police
videotape, and Defendant's trial counsel did not object to the admission. Mr. Barnes' decision
not to object did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, and was the consequence of
Mr. Barnes' trial strategy. The State of Utah asserts that, in his defense of the Defendant, Mr.
Barnes did not dispute the fact Defendant's pet store was in an appalling condition at the time
officers arrived on the scene. Rather, Mr. Barnes based his defense on the fact the Defendant
was not in control of the pet store at the time, and in fact had left the pet store, and the care of
the animals, in the control of her estranged husband, James Sisk.
Moreover, the State of Utah asserts that, even had Mr. Barnes objected to the
videotape, the trial court would have overruled that objection. Utah Rule of Evidence 403
states that relevant evidence will only be deemed inadmissible if "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, in the
usual cases, there exists "a presumption in favor of admission." State v. Betha. 341 Utah Adv.
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Rep. 8, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah
1989).
In the present case, the videotape of the crime scene was highly probative. At the
time of trial, the Defendant's defense rested on the fact the Defendant had been admitted to
Dixie Regional Medical Center on July 16, 1997, the day officers discovered the animals.
Therefore, the Defendant disclaimed any responsibility for the conditions then existing.
However, it was the State's position the pet store had been in a deplorable condition for a
considerable amount of time prior to July 16, 1997. To establish the elements of the offenses,
the State had to prove that the Defendant "fail[ed] to provide necessary food, care or shelter
for an animal in his custody" and, with intent, "kill[ed] or cause[d] to be killed an animal
without having a legal privilege to do so." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301(l)(a),(3)(c) (1953, as
amended). Moreover, the State had the burden of establishing that the Defendant failed to
provide the necessities of food, care and shelter for a substantial period of time. In addition,
the State had to match each of the thirty-seven (37) animals to a specific count in the
Information.
Therefore, to establish its theory of the case, the State had to present evidence that
the conditions at the pet store had been in existence for more than one or two days. The
videotape clearly showed that the animals at Defendant's pet store had not been provided
proper food, care, or shelter for a considerable length of time, and that the lack of such care
14

had actually caused the death of some of those animals. In addition, the videotape illustrated
that these were conditions which would take several days to create. Therefore, the videotape
established the elements of the offenses, and the State's theory of the case.
The State of Utah is aware that certain classes of evidence, although relevant, may be
excluded on grounds that such evidence has an unusual propensity to prejudice a jury. See
State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d at 1229. However, the videotape of Defendant's pet store does not
fall within the three categories of evidence recognized by this Court as evidence with an
unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice the jury. These three exceptions include: "(1)
gruesome photos of a homicide scene; (2) a rape victim's past sexual activities with someone
other than the accused; and (3) statistical matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such
as witness veracity." State v. Moore. 788 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
In addition, given the fact five (5) of the counts dealt with Aggravated Cruelty to
Animals, and thirty-two (32) of the counts dealt with Cruelty to Animals, the videotape
actually served as a tool to dispel the confusion a jury might experience in hearing evidence
relating to such a large number of counts. It permitted the State to clearly identify which
animals applied to which counts.
Furthermore, even if Mr. Barnes had objected to the introduction of the videotape,
and the trial court had sustained that objection, the State of Utah avers that this occurrence, in
and of itself, would not alter the outcome of the trial. At trial, the State called Officers Gunter
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and Thomas of the Cedar City Police Department's Animal Control Division. These officers
testified as to the conditions in the pet store when they first received the complaint. In
addition, Dr. Thinnes testified as to physical condition of the animals. Dr. Thinnes testified
that, based on his expertise as a doctor of veterinary science, and based upon his examination
of the animals located within the pet store, the animals in Defendant's store had not been
properly cared for, and that the animals' condition did not result from a mere one or two days'
neglect. The State asserts that a jury would have convicted the Defendant based upon the
testimony of these witnesses, as well as other evidence presented at trial. Therefore there is no
reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted absent the videotape.
2.

THE TERM OF DEFENDANT'S PROBATION PROHIBITING HER
FROM OWNING OR POSSESSING ANY ANIMALS, AND
REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO RID HERSELF OF ALL ANIMALS IN
HER POSSESSION DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

The Defendant's probation, in pertinent part, prohibited the Defendant from seeking,
obtaining, or performing any type of employment that included the sale, possession, care, or
transportation of any animal. In addition, the Defendant was ordered to sell or trade the
animals in her possession within forty-five (45) days of her sentence. This term of probation
also prohibited the Defendant from possessing or owning any animals during the period of her
probation. See Appendix A; Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of
Probation, and Commitment, p. 4, ^ 9-10). These terms of probation neither violate the
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article 1, Section 9 of the Utah
Constitution, which both guarantee the right of individuals to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." In addition, Article 1, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution states that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishment be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary
rigor."
In defining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, with respect to the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
criminal punishment will be deemed cruel and unusual punishment when it is excessive,
barbaric, or disproportionate to the offense committed. In other words, the penalty must have
a rough proportionality to the nature of the crime. See Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 284-90,
103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).
This interpretation has been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court with respect to
Article 1, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution. In State v. Gardner. 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah
1997) (citations omitted), the Utah Supreme Court held that the standard for determining
whether a punishment rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment is "'"'whether the
17

sentence imposed in proportion to the offense committed is such as to shock the moral sense of
all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.""" See also State
v. Mace. 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996); State v. Andrews. 843 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1992).
In State v. Gardner, the Court correctly stated that, "to the extent. . . cruelty is
defined as that which is 'stem' or anything 'causing or conducive to injury, grief or pain,' any
punishment administered by the State is by definition cruel." State v. Gardner at 633-34; see
also Burlett v. Holden. 835 P.2d 989, 991, citing Rhodes v. Chapman. 452 U.S. 337, 347,
101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) ("'To the extent that [prison] conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society. '")•
Therefore, a penalty must rise to the level of wanton, insensate, or vindictive to be
characterized as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. In essence, "a punishment must at least be
justifiable in terms of retributive justice — that is, it must represent the 'just deserts' of the
criminal act — in order to avoid invalidation as an excessive punishment. . . under Article 1,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution." Id. At 635, citing State v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 390
(Utah 1995) (Durham, J., dissenting).
Of relevance in the present case is the fact the Defendant was charged with, and
convicted of, five (5) counts of Aggravated Cruelty to Animals, and thirty-two counts of
Cruelty to Animals. The evidence presented at trial established that Defendant was not only
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incapable of properly caring for animals, but that she was also incapable of ensuring that
someone else would adequately care for those animals in her absence. The provision in
Defendant's probation prohibiting her from seeking, obtaining, or performing any type of
employment which included the sale, possession, or transportation of animals, and the
provision ordering the Defendant to sell or trade the animals in her possession at the time of
sentencing, and prohibiting her from possessing any other animals, is directly proportional to
the Defendant's conviction.
In imposing these probation terms on the Defendant, the trial court served at least
two purposes. One of the purposes served was retributive in nature — an attempt by the trial
court to appropriately penalize the Defendant for the atrocious manner in which she
"maintained" the animals at her pet store. In addition, the terms of Defendant's probation also
served the purposes of deterrence. In prohibiting the Defendant from operating a business
involving animals, and from actually owning any animals, the trial court was attempting to
remove any possibility the Defendant might re-offend during the period of her probation.
The punishment imposed by the trial court on the Defendant was in proportion to the
offense committed, and was not sufficient to shock the moral sense of all reasonable
individuals as to what was right and proper under the circumstances. Therefore, the
punishment neither violates the United States Constitution's, nor the Utah State Constitution's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant was not denied her Constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel during her trial. Mr. Barnes' representation of the Defendant did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonable representation, and did not result in prejudice to the
Defendant. The decision not to object to the police videotape was based on sound trial
strategy. Furthermore, the probative value of the videotape outweighed any prejudicial effect
the videotape might have. Moreover, even if the videotaped had been excluded from evidence
based on a defense objection, that act, in and of itself, would not have altered the outcome of
the trial. There is no reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted of the
charges against her had Mr. Barnes objected to introduction of the videotape. Therefore, the
jury's verdict should be affirmed.
In addition, neither the provision in Defendant's probation prohibiting the Defendant
from engaging in any employment involving the care, possession, or transportation of animals,
nor the provision requiring the Defendant to sell or trade animals in her possession at the time
of sentencing rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. The punishment in
Defendant's case was proportional to the nature of the offense, and served the legitimate
retributive and deterrent interests of justice. Therefore, the punishment neither violates the
United States Constitution's, nor the Utah State Constitution's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, and consequently should not be overturned.
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SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE,
ORDER OF PROBATION, AND
COMMITMENT

vs.
DEBORAH JO ANN SISK,
Defendant.

)

Criminal No. 971500759

)

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

The Defendant, DEBORAH JO ANN SISK, having been convicted pursuant to a jury trial
and jury verdict of five (5) counts of AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, each a Class
A Misdemeanor, and thirty-one (31) counts of CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, each a Class B
Misdemeanor, on December 19, 1997, and the Court having entered said verdicts and thereafter
having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and after said report was
prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having been called on for sentencing
on February 10,1998, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, DEBORAH JO ANN
SISK, having appeared before the Court in person together with her attorney of record, Keith C.
Barnes, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns,
and the Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and having further reviewed the

file in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, her attorney, and the Iron
County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the
following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment,
to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DEBORAH JO ANN SISK, has been convicted, pursuant to a jury trial and jury verdict, of five (5)
counts of AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, each a Class A Misdemeanor, and thirtyone (31) counts of CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, each a Class B Misdemeanor, and the Court
having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DEBORAH JO ANN SISK, and pursuant
to her conviction of Count I, AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, a Class A
Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of
one (1) year, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Iron County Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DEBORAH JO ANN SISK, pay a fine in
the sum and amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), plus an eighty-five percent
(85%) surcharge, for her conviction of Count I, AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO AN ANIMAL, a
Class A Misdemeanor.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that sentences for Counts II through XXXVI shall be stayed
pending the Defendant's successful completion of all terms and conditions of probation.
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of incarceration imposed and the
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DEBORAH JO ANN SISK, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months
under the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the
following terms, provisions, and conditions:
1.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by the

Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth herein,
shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are hereby made
a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the

Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

That the Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this

probation.
4.

That the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a

period of fifteen (15) days.
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5.

That the Court shall conduct a restitution hearing upon the Defendant's completion

of the term of incarceration to determine the amount of restitution (if any) owed to Cedar City
Corporation.
6.

That the Defendant shall pay a fine and surcharge in the amount of one thousand five

hundred dollars ($1,500) or, in the alternative, complete three hundred (300) hours of community
service as approved by the Court and Adult Probation and Parole.
7.

That the Defendant shall continue ongoing mental health treatment with Southwest

Center until released by the treatment provider.
8.

That the Defendant shall reimburse Iron County in the sum and amount of two

hundred dollars ($200) for public defender fees at a rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole.
9.

That the Defendant shall not seek, obtain, or perform any type of employment that

includes the sale, possession, care, or transportation of any animal.
10.

That the Defendant shall sell or trade the animals currently in the possession (six

dogs) within forty-five (45) days of the date of this sentence. Thereafter, the Defendant shall not
possess or own any animals as a term and condition of this probation.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DEBORAH JO ANN SISK,
and deliver her to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah, there to be
kept and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of
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Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment.
DATED this

I

/

day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

ROBERT T. BRAITH
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UT.
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the onginal Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and Commitment in the case entitled
State of Utah vs. Deborah Jo Ann Sisk. Criminal No. 971500759, now on file and of record in my
office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this

4~~>day of February. 1998.

CAROLYN BULLOCH
CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
(

S E

^HidiA nu

By:.
Deputy Distn6LCourt Cle

